ÁGNES UTASI:

PARTNERSHIP AND INDIVIDUALISM

(MARRIED COUPLES, COHABITERS AND DIVORCED IN 24 COUNTIES)

Marriage and the family represented an outstanding value in the value system of most of the differentiated societies. Most probably this had a rational reason, namely that no other community proved suitable to ensure both economic and emotional security with biological reproduction.

Mostly happy family life and a “good marriage” is heading the preferences of humans presented themselves in desires. However parallel with becoming individualised, family happiness only remains a target, for unselfishness, necessary for a good relationship between spouses is missing or fading out. The main reason for this is the fact that unselfishness expected for the operation of the traditional family is mostly contradictory to individual freedom, to individual egoism, to a rivalry between individuals and to most of the values believing in selfeffectuation as well as to the order of values underlining the priority of large communistic interests.

While family-marital cohabitation is usually connected with the subordination of the priority of traditional values as well as the individual values, desires and individual freedom to the interests of the family, the extra-family social milieu encourages a fight with prominence on the individual, for “healthy” egoism, individual success and, in a favourable situation it induces a minimal solidarity towards the extremely backlagging downcast strata. It seems that living within the family demands a differing priority and preference of values from the individual, while extra-family well-being requires others. The contradictory value priorities often result in disharmony in everyday lifestyle, increase conflicts within the falmily and undermine the family institution.

We are inclined to presume that the indicated ambivalence of the values is the result of urbanization, of globalizing world processes. It is an undeniable fact that earlier the smaller and closer communities, defending their own interests, meant a strong control and strictly safeguarded the family, as the smallest community of human cohabitation with their conventions. Parallel with urbanization a lessening control of the surrounding community could be experienced. This is true, although family community life demanding unselfishness and selfcontrol was, most probably always contradictory to individual aims, desires, individual activity and preferences. It seems that it was always difficult to preserve family cohesion, therefore “compulsion” was applied, unity had to be continuously strengthened with social conventions. Thus the presently more frequently experienced disintegration of the family was not only caused by the changes in living conditions, much more the situation that there is a lessening number of means compelling-prompting spouses to remain together, and the compelling-prompting effect of values transmitted by the surrounding community is also lower.

From among the conventions, earlier strengthening the families, the more general and more consistent community expectation than the present one rises above the values of religion together with the more direct control of the community. The economic compulsions of the pre-modernizational period also meant a similar cohesional power, primarily the small family economy which ensured livelihood for the majority of society, or the employment of women explicitly within the familiy and the maintenance of the labour market for men. The religious values, accepted by the majority of societies and the productive economy by the family which dominated in economic life produced such moral, psychic and economic compulsions which, even in the case of deteriorated relationships, encouraged couples to “voluntarily” live together all their life and marriages did not disintegrate. Law also sanctioned cohabitation.

The first explosive change was created by the emergence of the bourgeois economy and then the appearance of the bourgeois society created by the law and order of the bourgeois society parallel with economic development, which placed the individual into the focus of protection, and on this basis most countries enacted the right of divorce. Although civilian divorce is in deep contradiction with the traditional order of value concerning the family and marriage – nevertheless it speeded up the process which resulted in the situation that less people believe in traditional family-matrimonial cohabitation than before and an increasing number of couples utilize the possibility of divorce ensured by law. Partnership relationship is becoming more popular and there is an increasing ratio of exmarital born children. In many countries young people delay matrimony and only get married after a longer or shorter period of partnership.

The social attitude contradictory to the family is indicated by the fact that despite all this young people are yearning for the family, based on perfect human harmony and possibly on love. The number of marriages is similar to that in earlier periods, more over after their divorce people strive to marry again, and many people several times experiment to create perfect family-matrimonial relations. However, parallel with economic development a considerable increase could be experienced in individual requirements as well as an increased demand towards each other and towards the family community. Following their higher level of requirements individuals again and again experiment with the next partnership and then with the next matrimony.

It seems that in the past decades the family structure underwent a transformation in the developed industrial societies. On the one side we meet several variations of persons who while cohabitating, define themselves as a family. Namely the tendency towards the plurality of the type of familes appears. There is an extreme variation of plurality when people of identical sex, fully denying traditional family values and living by earlier explicitly prohibited norms, define themselves as a family and carry out a fight for their civil right to be recognized as a family. Another extreme variation is the world of communes.

As the result of increased plurality there is mostly a decrease in the number of those who choose family life explocitly based on traditional relationship and numerous variations emerge defined as the “maimed family”. Alongside the increase in the number of variations there is, with the exception of the communes, a decreasing number of persons cohabitating in families.

Thus, parallel with the plurality of types of families, they disintegrate into smaller unities, in fact become nuclearized. In fact this tendency started with the disintegration of the family economies, with the winding-up of the economic necessity of multigenerational cohabitation and with the decrease in the number of children catalyzed also by the progress of civilization.

Nuclearization – at least without socio-economic conditions ensuring a moderate prosperity – ends in privation, therefore pluralization and nuclearization of the family types mostly appear in the civilizationally developed societies, where the relative development of society can ensure that the majority have individual income or state subsidy.

Under the changed economic and social conditions couples, in a critical raltionship, often search for reasons to adhere to compliance and unselfishness, search for the aim which would make it worthwhile to maintain the family ensemble which only produces more an further conflicts. They are searching for the means with which the family cohesive power could be reproduced, with which they would be able to accept the conditions of cohabitation and subordinate their individual requirements to the interests of the family community.

Without the harmonization of self-interest and the common interests of the family, the members of the family become frustrated and if this harmony cannot be achieved family community will frequently become resolved. The harmonization of the two different interests is usually a continuous assignment which is valid for the entire period of family life. It is also true that affection and economic interests produced in the family provide a considerable emotional help for this continuous harmonizational task. Shortage of room which may turn divorce impossible or financial interest linked with resources of the other party may confine the family. All this can be supplemented with a moral power transmitted through still existing traditional values which may also be an inducement to continue the family community.

However, in the civilizationally developed, prospering societies young people are inclined to discover before the wedding that family cohabitation mostly necessitates self-control and the subordination of individual requirements and interests to family interests and requirements. Under the effect of this realization an increasing number of couples join later in marriage, they make plans for the future and delay the date for settling and entering in matrimony (also) in well-to-do societies.

A spreading of divorce, delayed marriages and an increasing number of partnership life indicate the weakening of traditional values earlier strongly transmitted by religion and the amplification of individual requirements. This process is intensified by the economic conditions which ensure moderate prosperity fo increasingly broad strata of society. In the majority of the developed countries a single person – whether it is a male or female – can gain individual income for work and it does not seem necessary to enter into economic alliance or remain in alliance with another person. He/she is able to raise their offspring and the welfare societies also provide socio-political assistance for this. This means that bourgeois couples do not have to live under the same roof with their spouse all their life when they are unable to feel in the same way towards each other which produced unselfishness and altruistic affection necessary for family cohabitation. Social public judgement provided its agreement to this change when the civilian right of divorce was introduced, although followers of religious values are still protesting against divorce and are against relationships differing from the traditonal and still consider marriage as indissoluble and as a life-long bond.

Nevertheless, researches indicate that the majority of social entities still receive so much values: affection and emotional and economic security from falmily cohabitation and so highly appreciate the family community with its love and care to be gained through “unselfish selfishness”, that are willing to harmonize individual requirements with the framework of family cohabitation.

It also seems that the richer a society, the broader the ratio of those who organize their life following their individual values and interests. They may consider involuntary adaptation to the members of the family as incompatible with their lifestyle and following self-accomplishing aims arrange their life in an indepent manner, or if they choose family relationship in a given phase of their life they do not consider it as valid for their entire life. In order to satisfy further necessities and requirements – also including the choice of a new partner – they consider it as resolvable. Thus according to our hypothesis, individualism expands necessities and increases the freedom of choice including the choice of a new partner and a new style of life. Individualism more frequently induces individuals to resolve traditional family cohabitation, to search for a new form of cohabitation or in a better case to renew a deteriorated relationship.

Alongside the development of societies the necessities of different social strata also show a progress while they become more differentiated. Adapting Maslow’s theory on necessities to this theme we believe that an emphasis on different necessities can appear for social strata living under differing living conditions. In societies where the majority already reached the level of civilizational necessities a larger number of individuals can concentrate their energy on the satisfaction of their prestige requirements, and then of their individual requirements of self realization. These circusmstances further move the individuals of “welfare societies” from the compulsion of undertaking limiting restrictions linked with traditional matrimony and family bonds.

In a few societies where major inequalities are indicated between the strata, a particular cyclicism can also be indicated by relative economic prosperity. Ascending on the social hierarchy harmony frequently slackens on the bottom level where only shortages exist and the family frequently collapses. However, on the level of minimal prosperity members of the family cling to each other and surrounding the existing few resources strive to strengthen the borders of the family. When we near the low middle class level again a stronger desire for individual eruption can be experienced, then in the middle segment of the middle class the traditional values show a more powerful operation which induce the family into binding a closer circle. However, on the level of the highest affluence the high intellectual and economic conditions followed by the thus produced requirements increase the freedom of individual choice to such an extent that they considerably pry apart the framework of traditional family cohabitation. The particular cyclicism between these strata is primarily indicated by the liberal matrimonial practice: divorce and extra-marital partnership as well as delayed marriage planned for a later date – though differentiated between the social strata.

Based on the above thoughts we believe that in the strata living on different levels of affluence in the social hierarchy traditional values appear stronger or looser on the various levels, accordingly whether the members wish to loosen the borders of these strata with the aim of advancement or strengthen them in order to remain on the level. Consequently the conventional middle class is the strictest guard of traditions which does not suffer from negative privileges in society and lives in relative welfare while it is far from the level of individualization which does not by all means require the strong alliance of the family members to maintain the already accomplished affluence.

Earlier Hungarian investigations indicated that divorce is most popular among the members of the social stratum living with the most privileges of the highest status and the highest ratio of those living in a partnership state can also be found among them. The investigations indicated the wavelike cyclic family closure of the social strata living under híerarchically differing living conditions also with strongly following traditional family values. Then they indicated a loosening of the family value traditions followed when reaching a somewhat more favourable level of conditions and reaching a higher level another strengthening was indicated. Finally reaching the “top” they indicated a “free choice” which considerably loosened the application of traditional family values.

The results of the Hungarian investigation may also be the consequences of a particular social order and development. Therefore it was questionable for us which is the general trend and whether there is one at all? So we looked for the answer on an international sample how extensive is the tendency of the pluralization and nuclearization of family ties in the different cultural and social structure of societies and how extensive is the practice of non-traditional family-matrimonial cohabitation in other countries.

We presumed that the economy, welfare and education ensured by the development of civilization and providing the individually highly free choice most probably transforms the earlier family structure. However, if the living conditions indicating social affluence are linked with a strong inducement to follow traditional values and maintain the religious or an other traditional framework of the family, the tendency of pluralization in the types of family with following cultural values prefered by the majority of society does not result despite the high economic prosperity to such extent as in the poorer, and less civilizationally developed societies.

We also presume that in societies where a tensive shortage of economic living conditions can be found without a social value consensus which would strengthen the traditional following of values directed on the safeguarding of the family framework, we shall also find a similar phenomenon than in the “decaying”lowest strata of societies which are lacking resources and where the complete lack of resources and the value hiatus also strongly force open the power which retains the unity of the family.

We examine the tendencies indicating the nuclearization an pluralization of the families along the above hypotheses in the various countries. Thus we start from the theory that the structure of the types of family and the extent of the traditional family-matrimonial relationship is indicated by the coefficient of two dimensions: the level of economic prosperity characterizing the given countries and the following of cultural values, the value consensus linked with the family values of the given society.

We used the data of the international family investigation ISSP noted down in 1996-1997 and carried out in 1994-1995 (TÁRKI, 1997). The data file records data from 24 countries and the number of interviewees was: 33,481. The national samples concerning sex and age include data of the population above 18 years of age.

NATIONAL STRUCTURE OF FAMILY STATUS

Not entirely two third of the total international sample consists of “married” (64,5 %) persons. The percentage of those living in matrimony is considerably higher in Australia (78 %), New Zealand (73 %), the Philippines (76 %) and Israel (75 %). It might be a coincidence that three are islands and one has been involved in an external fight for decades encouraging social cohesion. On the other hand a relatively strong isolation, consequent to the geographic situation of an insular country, may be a maintaining-safeguarding power of relationships.

However the age structure of married couples also indicate considerable cultural differences in these countries. In Australia the ratio of under thirty married couples is rather low, only a few percentage of the total (3,0 %). After these the ratio of married couples is equally high in each age group. It is likely that while in Australia young people delay the date of marriage, afterward seem to adhere to the values of the cultural milieu. Namley economic circusmstances do not compel the inhabitants to enter into early and rapid matrimony, but the cultural values encourage people to maintain the marriage and follow tradtitional family values.

From among the countries outstandingly gathering married couples, the sample of the Philippines presents another extreme. Here they enter into matrimony at an early age, for one quarter of all married couples are under the age of 30 (24 %). Partly this refers to a stronger economic power of cohesion than among the previous and partly the high family cohabitation indicates the strong family maintaining effect of the traditional values. This latter can be presumed also with regard to Israel where the strict value system of the Jewish religion enforces an early matrimony of young people. This is also indicated by the fact that almost one fifth (18 %) of all married couples are under thirty in Israel’s sample while the religion consisting of strict values also helps the enforcement of the traditional family-matrimonial values.

The ratio of widowed people is 7,6 % in the entire sample. The ratio of widowed persons was found particularly high in three former socialist countries: Hungary (16,7 %), Bulgaria (15 %) and Poland (12 %). Northern Ireland also excells with the high ratio of widowed persons (14 %). However, the age composition of widowed persons in the given countries also indicates a particular internal social differentiation. Both in Hungary and more so in Bulgaria the majority of widowed persons are over sixty, in Poland more than one quarter of the widowed persons are maximum fifty years old. In Northern Ireland one quarter of them are younger than fifty and more than one third are still in their fifties (39 %). The high ratio of widowed persons in Hungary can be explained with the higher mortality of men and thus with the asymmetric marriage market necessary for oldage remarriages. Both in Northern Ireland and in Poland the remarriage of widowed persons is most probably and primarily curbed by social cultural values.

The ratio of those of divorced status in itself provides little indication of the characteristic ratio of divorce in the various societies, for very often divorce is followed by another marriage. More accurately, couples frequently only dissolve their deteriorated and tired relationship when they have the possibility to enter into another bondage. Thus, the high ratio of divorce in certain countries only indicates the requirement for individualization in some cases, and most probably we find a certain pressure in the high ratio of those who remain alone after their divorce. In the international sample the ratio of divorced status is low compared to the number of divorce cases (5,2 %). The highest ratio of divorced status can be found in the United States (15,3 %) and in Great Britain (12 %) where social economy most probably refers to an individual choice in the case of a high ratio of divorced status. It is imaginable that this style of life here genuinely indicates the appearance of the tendency of nuclearization as the consequence of prosperity.

At the same time each other country with a high ratio of divorce belongs to the former socialist “camp”: Hungary (8,5 %), Russia (8,4 %), East Germany (7,4 %) and the Czech Republic (7,2 %). These countries developed a particularly ambivalent individualization and emancipation. In these countries a relatively high ratio of women became employees, thus in the case of a deteriorated marriage it became easier to quickly free themselves of the bonds. The low level of male income did not raise the welfare of the family while according to the law the only considerable asset of the family, the home was without a few exceptions, passed to the female part of the divorced couple. Thus, following the divorce both males and females could start into another matrimony with a shortage of resources. This frequently prevented the settling of a new marriage, but perhaps a partnership was created.

The ratio of separately living is low in the entire sample. The considerably higher than the average can be primarily found in Northern Ireland (5,1 %) and New Zealand (3 %), most probably because the value following of the traditonal values reflects strict social conventions in both countries slowing down the decisions on divorce and for a long period places the former married couples into this parking-like course. We saw in the USA and in Russia that the ratio of divorced cases was higher than the average and parallel with this the ratio of sperately living is also higher than the average (USA 2,9 % and Russia 2,3 %).

There is a considerable dispartiy according to societies in the ratio of those who are single and never lived in marriage. We believe that the ratio of nver married people is partly high and the time of marriage was considerably delayed in countries where economic prosperity ensure a larger room for individualization, where society accepts the method to practice a longer style of life free from family restrictions. In some well-to-do countries, young people adhere to a particularly popular and youthful style of life namely that they delay to enter into the traditonal family-matrimonial bondage. Nevertheless, in addition to economic welfare this also requires the value tolerance of society and in such a case, instead of marriage, a cosiderable part of young people live in partnership.

Another reason for the high population ratio of the non-married status can also be the very favourable age structure. However, parallel with the development of civilization and the increased average life-span, this can be less found in the examined countries.

Thirdly, the following of socially conventioned strict traditional values, notwithstanding a rather satisfactory material welfare, encourages young people to delay matrimony. This is indicated by the sample of the relatively prosperous countries where alongside the broad ratio of never married people cohabitation without marriage shows a low proportion.

One fifth of the entire sample (21,5 %) live as singles without ever having married. An outstanding high ratio of these can be found in Norway (34 %), Canada (30 %), Spain (29 %), Italy (28 %), the Netherlands (28 %) and in Northern Ireland (28 %).

The ratio of those living in traditional marriage is very low in Norway where extra-marital cohabitation is significant. It can be presumed that young people delay the date of marriage. In each listed country the reason for delayed marriage is different and so is the reason for the high ratio of the single status. We presume that the reason for the delay is mostly the adherence to strict traditonal cultural values in Northern Ireland, Spain and Italy. Delayed marriage may be a preventive measure to avoid the socially less tolerated divorce. However, in a particular manner and under the effect of strict cultural values extramarital cohabitation is very rare.

DIVORCE

The ratio of divorce in Hungary was higher in the decades after the turn of the centruy than in many of the other European countries. The realitve “lead” of the country in this field increased after the second world war and as a result of the liberalization of the divorce low intensified in the fifties. However the liberal low concerning divorce spread in most European countries in the seventies and by today the ending of marital conflicts with divorce became socially accepted all over the continent. In the meantime Hungary slipped from the “forefront” of Eurpean divorce statistics to the middle zone.

The question of the international survey connected with the family-sturcture-change is the ratio of divorce namely what extent it reached in the various countries. In this connection demography mainly registers those divorced status as well as the number of dissolved marriages. The present examination also used similar indices on the basis of which it was earlier indicated that only a few percentage of the adult population belong to the divorced status for, most probably, remarriages conceal the genuine ratio of divorces.

The intertanitonal sociological survey raised the question to all interwievees – including also the present wedded ones – whether they ever got a divorce during their earlier life. Thus complementing the information gained about those of present divorced status we receive a more precise picture about the national ratios of divorce which mostly undermines family cohabitation.

Although we have to state that divorce does not effect the family institution in a way that the earlier divorced couples mostly enter into a new matrimony and set up their new family, namely live as married persons but this practice is entirely contradictory to the family stability demanding traditional values.

Considering the entire sample about one tenth of it (11,8 %) got a divorce during their life time. The list of those who were divorced any time during their life is led by the Americans (28 %), in the same manner to those of divorced status. The next country on the list of ever divorced is Russia (23,5 %) followed by Great Britain (18 %), East Germany (16 %), Sweden (16,4 %), the Czech Republic (15,3 %) and Hungary (14,5 %).

The societies of the two “major political powers” cannot be considered similar with regard to their economic situation or the everyday circumstances of the families. Consequently, divorce cannot be considered as a human choice which developed on the basis of similar requirement level in the two countries. If we expound the changes in the preferencies connected with the earlier presented hypothesis of the requirement hierarchy we also include the choice of human relationship and cohabitation, then most probably divorce in the USA dissolving the families can be more powerfully linked with the reqirement of individual self-realization than in Russia. In contrast, the strong lack of resources spoil family relationships among the Russian population and in addition the official neglect of traditional (religious) values does not encourage families for further cohesion. This explains that in Russia the economic shortage and the lack of traditional cultural values both aggravate the maintenance of conventional family-marital bonds. In our opinion this shortage of resources is so extensive in the main part of family relationships that even the clinging to each other is unable to increase these resources.

There is another considerable factor which lessens the family stability of marriages both in the USA and Russia. Both societies blend many multinational cultures. The difference in the values achieved with socialization in non-homogeneous marriages also aggravates the safeguarding of the marital unity.

The other pole of the scale indicating the divorce order, namely the order of those who least entered divorce and who most follow the values of sticking together in traditional family life, is led by Ireland (2,4 %), Italy (4,3 %), Japan (5,1 %) and Spain (5,9 %).

With the exception of Japan, the other three countries live with strong Roman Catholic traditions. As it is know, divorce was even officially prohibited in Italy up to recent times. In Japan the value order of society socializes the citizen to such discipline that the private sphere – such as the inter-maritel disharmony – can only very slightly appear in people’s everyday life.

With regard to divorce at least two questions have to be answered. One: starting out form the hypothesis that if the expansion of the framework of lifestyle causes the most frequent individual choice then moving toward the msot educated ones, toward those of the highest status we find a ratio of those in the amjority of societies who choose divorce to solve their intermarital conflicts. The entire sample undoubtedly reflects this trend. There is a considerably lower ratio in the group of lessser educated persons who changed their deteriorated relationship with divorce (4,6 to 7,5 %), while the ratio of those who ever divorced is increasing parallel with increased education. It reaches its peak in the sample group of university graduates (14 %).There is a similar trend in the presently divorced status as well.

At the same time this trend asserts itself in a different manner with regard to societies of the various countries with differing living conditions and value preferences. In about ten countries – also including Hungary – the increase of the ever divorced persons is unambiguous alongside the schooling scale starting form the less educated ones toward the highest educated persons, while in some countries this is less conspicuous. Nevertheless the highest ratio of divorce can be found in most countries among the university and college graduates.

The essence of the other question investigating the ratio of divorce is whether, there is an increase among the ever divorced or presently divorced people moving toward the younger age groups or is it rather stagnating. Is it possible that eventually an age group can be discovered which indicates a caesura-like change in the given countries with regard to divorce ratio.

The age group segment of the divorced status mostly indicates the broadest stratum of divorced people – both in the entire sample and also with regard to the national data – among people in their thirties (21 % of all divorced) and even more so in their forties (30,1 % of all divorced). Less people among those in their fifties (23 %) and in their sixties (15,2 %) are to be found among the divorced couples for divorce as the practice to solve conflicts was hardly accepted by social public opinion until the past decades, and not even by law in some countries.

The ratio of divorce is “still” low among the youngest, namely among those in their twenties. The reason for this is the fact that in most countries the date of matrimony has been delayed, thus the long lasting partnership in many countries followed by an official change in the status comes into being only at a later date. On the other hand the marriage of young people has not existed for such a long time and the time for the emergence of conflicts was too short.

The age group ratio of the ever divorced in the various countries also presents those countries where divorce is most general. If we investigate the age group of the youngest, namely those in their twenties we find thath the list is topped by Russia (12,6 %), the USA (9,6 %), then by Great Britain (6,4 %) although at a much lower ratio. The same three countries excel among the age group of the thirties. The Americans top the list (USA 29,1 %) followed by Russia (26,2 %). Wich means that more than one quarter of those in their thirties in both “major powers” dissolved their marriage at least once during their life time. Great Britain is not lagging much behind (22,1 %) on this list.

The ratio of ever divorced int he age group of people in their forties presents a somewhat different order than among the previous. There is no change in the placing of the USA (43 %) and Russia (32 %) but with a much higher ratio of divorce than in the previous age groups mainly because the longer time spent in marriage by the “older ones” also increases, cumulates the ratio of dissolved marriages. The third country in this age group is the Czech Republic (30,7 %), somewhat “preceding” Great Britain (29,4 %). In addition to the previous list we find a relatively high ratio of the ever divorced in their forties in East Germany (23 %), Austria (21,8 %), Hungary (25,4 %), Sweden (22,2 %), New Zealand (20,3 %) and Canada (23 %).

According to our hypothesis the high ratio of the ever divorced persons in their fifties indicates that the practice to solve marital conflicts also spread among the oldest age groups in the given countries or that public opinion provided the possibility for such a solution. In an unchanged manner, the list is led by the USA where the ratio of those ever divorced and now in their fifties is rather high (41,1 %) followed by Sweden wheren early one third of the aging population (30,2 %) was divorced at least once and Russia is not much behind (28,8 %).

As the data indicate both the lists of those ever divorced or presently divorced are led by the USA, Russia and Great Britain and not only in the order of countries but also with regard to age groups. Nevertheless a considerable decrease can be found in the age group of people in their thirties compared to those in their forties ever divorced in some countries. For example these include Australia (40-s: 14,2 %, 30-s: 7,5 %), Hungary (40-s: 25,4 %, 30-s: 16 %), Sweden 40-s: 22,2 %, 30-s: 11,1 %), Poland (40-s: 13,4 %, 30-s: 6,9 %), Canada (40-s: 23,3 %, 30-s: 14,7 %). In these groups the ratio of ever divorced among people in their thirties decreased to half compared to that among the forties. The reason for this decrease is most probably the fact that the increasing ratio of partnerships, extramarital “experimental” marriages and delayed marriages objectively decrease the “possibility” of divorce among the age group of the thirties. Thus the decreasing ratio of divorce among those in their thirties does not indicate the strengthening of family realtions, more the tendency of pluralization in the types of the family.

SUCCESSFUL “EXPERIMENTAL” MARRIAGES

Partnership which preceded the marriage of those who now live as a married couple has been defined in our research as an “experimental marriage”. Experimental marriage has stronger traditions in some societies while in others it was strictly forbidden by public opinion. Therefore we presumed that the effect of the cultural traditions were more strongly exercized in the differences between the countries in addition to the effect of modernization on sexual relationship. Nevertheless different effects often appeared in unison.

More than one quarter of the partial sample (N= 22 369) of married couples (26 % with N=5959) lived in partnership with their present spouse prior to their marriage. The highest ratio of the interviewed married couples who lived in an “experimental marriage” with their present spouse (53,3 % of the couples) was found in Sweden, almost half in East Germany (46,7 %), in Russia (47,3 %, in Austria (43 %) and in Norway (42 %).

About one third of the present married couples started in a partnership in Slovenia, West Germany, the Czech Republic and also in Great Britain.

In Hungary (14,5 %) and in Poland (12,5 %) the sample shows a reatively low ratio with regard to those who started their marriage in an “experimental” manner, because pre-marital partnership was not a general attitude among older people. The data gained in Hungary indicated that primarily the two extreme poles of the highest and lowest educated strata entered in such a relationship and from there it spread towards the other levels of the social hierarchy.

Altrough the practice of pre-marital cohabitation is very high in the USA (29,1 % of married couples), it remains behind the ratio of divorce found in the same area, for with regard to divorce the American sample took, together with the Russian, a “leading place” on the list. The American data concerning the data of “experimental marriages” were relatively moderate – altrough referred to a general practice – for a relative large number of people prefere here, instead of an experimental marriage, an immediate matrimony which then effected by the high demands and expectations towards each other as the consequence of prosperity and the level of requirements is shortly followed by divorce. This is confirmed by the earlier indicated high divorce data among young Americans according to which every tenth American (9,6 %) in their twenties were divorced. Thus despite the fact that the USA sample lags behind the “top” with regard to the “experimental” marriages it retains its “leading” position with regard to its liberal marital practice dissimilar to the traditional one.

In this investigation we also revealed the countries in which pre-marital cohabitation is not or hardly tolerated by society and because of this it is a lesser spread cultural routine. The lowest ratio of those who cohabitated with their present spouse before the marriage was found in Italy (4,4 % of all married couples), in Japan (7,5 %), in Spain (7,2 %)and in Northern Ireland (9 %). If this order is compared with the order of ever divorced persons we find that the ratio of those ever divorced is also the lowest in these countries. In another approach, social conventions which encourage the following of traditional marital relations also impose considerably stricter ethical norms on the sample of these countries than in the other countries of the sample. Most probably the dominant determinant of this is the following of strict religious values by society, and in the case of Japan the rigorous order and discipline transmitted through the Japanese culture, linked with the acceptance of the consequent values, based on an inaquality between the spouses.

The ratio of those who precede their marriage with partnership is increasing parallel with the schooling level. The highest ratio of “experimental marriage” can be found among the university graduates in almost every country’s sample while among those who completed elementary education hardly half of the university graduates’ ratio can be found with regard to the “experimental marriage”. Although the trend gradually increases from the less educated ones to the higher educated ones, a break can be noticed on the gradually rising line: compared to the previous schooling group the ratio of those who lived in partnership prior to their marriage falls somewhat back among people of secondary education, namely those who passed the matriculation. The majority of the matriculated persons mostly belong to the conservative lower middle class which strives for security and abstain from all types of excesses and the disregard of the moral values. At the same time the majority of university graduates can live in society with a freer chance of choice socialized under the most favourable living conditions, including the higher level of requirements, the free choice of partnership and the "“right” of extra-marital cohabitation.

The data of premarital cohabitation according to age groups indicate that in most countries the practice of premarital cohabitation started to spread among those who are now in their forties. Not quite one fifth (18,6 %) of those who sarted their life with an experimental mariage belong to those in their fifties (1,9 %) and their forties (7,9 %). At the same time data unambiguously indicate that in Austria, Sweden and East Germany there was a considerable ratio of older people who started their proper marriage in an experimental way. Namely premarital cohabitation has primarily traditions in these countries.

The ratio of those who start their joint life in an experimental marriage is the broadest among those in their thirties (37,7 %) and their forties (26,1 %), thus moving toward the younger age groups to the youngest ones we can register an expressed trend to engage in an “experimental marriage”. (Most probably the trend will continue with increasing ratios when the present twenties will turn into their thirties.)

PARTNERSHIP RELATIONS

The previous indicated that prior to their marriage an increasing number of people live in partnership in the different countries, although to a different extent. All in all one quarter of married people (with regard to the entire sample, namely also including the non-married entities the ratio is 17,7 %) lived with a partner who then became their spouse in marriage. Naturally premarital cohabitation is similarly contradictory to traditional family values as is divorce in most societies.

The research strived to present a picture of the extent of partnership relations and did not find sufficient to only register the ratio of premarital cohabitation among married couples. It also expected an answer from the research whether the interviewees ever cohabited with somebody with whom they did not get married at a later date.

Altogether 8,4 % of the entire international sample lived with their previous partner, 6,5 % with their present partner and 1,9 % lived or live with both their former and with their present partner. Namely in addition to the partnership which was considered an “experimental marriage” with their present spouse 16,8 % of the total sample is or was living in another partnership.

[Amalgamating the categories of those living in partnership with their “present partner” and with “both the present and former partner” we find that with a self-arrangement concerning the present family status almost every tenth person (8,4 %) of the international sample admitted to live in actual partnership. The list of those presently living in a partnership (8,4 %) is headed by Russia (21,2 %), the Czech Republic (22,7 %) and Norway (16,8 %). Surch actually existing partnership was least admitted in Japan (1,8 %) and Ireland (1,7 %) but it was also very low in Poland (2,7 %), in Bulgaria (2,9 %) and in Italy (2,5 %).]

Not incuding the experimental marriage but calculating with the ratio of those who ever lived or are living in partnership which did not result in proper marriage (16,8 %) of the sample) – the list of the concerned countries somewhat differs form the order of those who are living in partnership at present. The list of those who lived in partnership but did not marry their former or present partner is headed by Sweden (32,5 %), the Czech Republic (32 %), Russia (26,6 %), Canada (26,3 %) and Norway (26,1 %).

The lowest ratio of those whose partnership did not turn into marriage was indicated in Japan (3,3 %), Italy (5,3 %) and Ireland (5,2 %). In other words, those countries are found among the strongest safeguards of traditional cohabitation where the data of divorce also indicated the conventional strict community attitude toward family values and bonds.

In the entire sample – not including the experimental marriages – the ratio of those who ever lived in partnership, is increasing parallel with the schooling level. At the same time, in countries where uneducated persons exist and were included in the sample, the ratio of those who lived or live in partnership is particularly high in the lowest uneducated group. Not including those who have no school education at all, moving upwards from those who did not complete their elementary education (7,8 %) to university and college graduates (22,9 %) a straight rise can be registered in the majority of the surveyed countries.

Mostly the samples of Austria, New Zealand and of the USA deviate from this trend where the ratio of those who ever lived in partnership is similar on every schooling level. In our opinion the reason for the trend not linked with the schooling level is the consequence of the relatively evenly favourable living conditions in these societies. For the majority of the social strata the chance to choose a choice of similar extent can be found in the social values and living conditions.

In contrast to the previous countries the ratio of those who ever livid in partnership is higher among the lesser schooled ones in Northern Ireland, Japan and the Philippines. It can be presumed that in these countries the cultural conventions concerning the traditional marital communities are so strong that social progress and the rise of prestige may be hindered by “renitent” cohabitation therefore the living conditions of those who avail themselves of status privileges less allow free choice in this field. The status of the strata afflicted by negative privileges is not really affected by a disparaged public opinion,therefore in a paradox manner they enter more freely in this form of relationship.

The investigation according to age groups indicates that the ratio of those who ever lived in partnership is also high among people in their sixties in some countries, for example it is particularly high in Norway (37 %) and in Sweden (21 %). In these countries the circle of those who ever chose partnership as a style of life is also considerable in the younger age groups. This fact again confirms the earlier hypothesis that partnership cohabitation has relatively old cultural traditions in these countries.

In contrast to the practice of the above countries we find a considerable rise among people in their sixties as comparad to those in their fifties with regard to partnership relations in Austria (from 14 to 23 %), in the Czech Republic (form 18 to 32 %) and in West Germany (form 17 to 24 %). There is also a considerably higher ratio in the sample of Bulgaria (from 8 to 17 %) and in Israel (from 11 to 19 %). This phenomenon indicates that partnership relationship is dinamically increasing in the oldest age groups of these countries, most probably ousting the practice of old age remarriage earlier accepted with traditional values.

In the Russian sample the ratio of those living in partnership has become a general and broadscale feature among the now fiftyish (37 %) people while it is considerably rarer among the older ones (19 %). In the USA the ratio of those who ever lived in partnership only increases considerably among those who are in their forties.

Obviously the entire population ratio of those who ever lived in partnership also includes those who engaged in the practice of the “experimental marriage”. According to the contracted data of the ratio of those who cohabitated prior to their matrimony (17,7 %) and the entire ratio of those who lived in partnership with their former and present partner (16,8 %) the entire sample indicates that about one third of the international sample (34,5 %) lived in partnership during their life time. This ratio indicates the considerable change in the values linked with traditional marriage and the family and the considerably spreading tolerance toward the liberal way of cohabitation.

The list of countries where people ever lived in partnership or “experimental marriage” – whether it was followed by marriage or not – is headed by Sweden (63,9 %) and Russia (58 %). Norway (49 %), Canada (44 %), Austria (47 %) and the two Germanies (East 47 % and West 42 %) are coming not far behind.

The other end of this scale, with regard to those who least engaged in any one form of partnership is primarily represented by Italy (8,1 %, Japan (8,5 %), the two Irelands (Republic 11,8 and North 11,2 %), and Spain (11,2 %).Most probably society here induces its nembers to traditional family cohabitation in the strictest manner.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SEXES

As the consequence of the unequal judgement of the sexes we presumed differences between sexes dissimilar to traditional relationships. We thought that men in general avail themselves of a greater chance of choice in society, therefore possessing a greater freedom of choice more individuals will deviate from the practice of conventional family and marital relationship.

No doubt premarital cohabitation, namely “experimental marriage” was chosen in most countries by a larger but not considerably higher ratio of men during their life time. Nevertheless exceptions can be found, for one third of the investigated countries: Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Bulgaria, Russia, New Zealand and Canada differ from this trend. Exactly in the latter countries we can see that women lived in partnership with their later husbands to a somewhat higher ratio than men.

There is also a higher ratio among men than among women in most countries where partnership was not followed by marriage. As an exception we can mention the Netherlands, Norway, Russia and the Czech Republic in this relation, where the ratio of those who ever lived in partnership was higher among women.

Data concerning divorce unabigously show a difference between the sexes. They indicate in a consequent manner thath the ratio of those ever divorced is higher among women almost without exception in every country and is considerably higher in some. Several reasons may explain this but most probably we could also find among them the effect of the world process of women’s emancipation. In traditional marriages the servicing tasks within the family are usually alloted to women. As emancipation is progressing, less and less women are willing to accept this and higher number of them strive to exit from the for them burdensome marriage, than do the husbands. On the other hand women – after their divorce and mainly if they live with their child or children in a welfare state – are provided with appropriate assistance. Therefore they do not lose economically too much in several countries and social strata. Consequently they can more freely choose to end their deteriorated marriage. These reasons may be true but there is a mathematically equal number of men and women in every divorce. Where is then the root of the difference?

Partly in the fact that the average age of women is higher, thus there is an obviously higher number of divorced women among the interviewees than men. On the other hand we saw that the ratio of men living in a partnership is higher, therefore there is also a higher ratio among them of those who split without an “official” divorce, namely exit from their partnership without being registered as divorced either statistically or in the mind of the interviewee.

TYPOLOGY OF FAMILY COHABITATION

Several differences were found between the countries with regard to the above examined dimensions, properly indicating partly the value preferences dominating in the countries and the differentiation originating from the dissimilar dynamics of the modernizational economic trend. It is obvious that the practice of matriomonial marriage cohabitation, differing from the conventional is spreading in every country but with a considerable difference according to countries or more precisely according to cultures. In addition the data also confirm that despite the spreading of the liberal forms of relationships the majority still prefer the nuclear family formed by traditional matrimonial cohabitation. Namely we can by no means speak about the end, the termination of marriage and family.

In order to present the typology indicating the liberal an traditional family-matrimonial practice we used data dissimilar to the earlier measured practice of traditional matrimonial relationships. Based on the measured variants we marked the areas beside the names of the countries where refering to the expressively higher average of the international sample a more liberal practice could be found.

Thus we indicated the ratio in countries where a significant difference to the average of the international sample was found:

(1) lower ratio of those living in a traditional marriage

(2) ratio of singles higher than the average

(3) striking ratio of divorced persons

(4) outstanding ratio of people living in experimental marriage

(5) outstanding ratio of persons ever lived in partnership

(6) outstanding ratio of ever divorced persons

(7) outstanding ratio of widowed persons

We were seeking for the structural connection by countries of the national ratios differing from the average in the different dimensions. Utilizing this we elaborated the typology of the extent of family-matrimonial cohabitation in the various countries, ranging from the dominating traditional to the types indicating more liberal relations.

The following table contains the name of countries noted with a * where the variables indicate a considrably higher ratio than the average, or in the case of married persons a considerably lower ratio than the average.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Married Single Divorced Experimen- Partner- Divorced Widowed

(low) tal ship in earlier

the past

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

USA * * * *

RUS * * * *

GB * * * *

N * * * *

D-E * * *

S * * *

CZ * * * *

A * *

H * * *

CDN * *

D-W * *

NL * *

SLO *

NIRL * * *

BG *

J *

IRL *

E *

I *

NZ

AUS

IL

PL

RP

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Based on the national characteristics in the different dimensions we built the types of cultural values concerning the traditional family married cohabitation situation.

1. LIBERAL:

United States, Russia, Norway, Great Britain, East Germany, Sweden and the Czech Republic

2. MODERATELY LIBERAL:

Austria, Hungary, Canada, Western Germany, Slovenia, the Netherlands

2. TRADITIONAL “DELAYER”:

Northern Ireland, Japán, Spain,

3. TRADITIONAL:

New Zealand, Bulgaria, Israel, Poland, the Philippines

More detailed typology distinguishing three grades for the grouping according to the extent of family traditions:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the case of the former typology only the protrudingly high values found in the different dimensions were taken into consideration, while the following typology put the countries in three grades on the variables indicating the liberal married-family cohabitation: with the differentiation of outstanding (H), medium (M), andl low (L) averages.

We hoped for a somewhat more exact result based on the thus received table.

Married Divorced Single Divorced Partners Experimental

in the past in the past partnership

R a t i o

AUS H * L* L M * L M

D-W M L M M M H

D-E M M L H M H

GB L H L H M H

NIRL L L M L L L

USA L H M H H H

A M L M M H H

H L M L M L L

I M L H L L L

IRL M L H L L L

NL L M H M M H

N L L H M H H

S M L M M H H

CZ M M M H H H

SLO M L M L L H

PL M L L L L L

BG M L L L M M

RUS M M L H H H

NZ H L L M M M

CDN M L H M H M

RP H L M L L M

IL H L L L M M

J M L M L L L

E M L H L L L

H=relitvely high ratio in the national sample

M=medium ratio

L=low ratio

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Typology according to the extent of traditional family cohabitation:

a) TRADITIONAL FAMILY COHABITATION in

Australia, Northern Ireland, Italy, Ireland, New-Zealand, the Philippines, Israel, Japán, Spain, Poland

b) MODERATELY TRADITIONAL FAMILY COHABITATION in

Western Germany, Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria

c) LESS TRADITIONAL FAMILY COHABITATION in

East Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Czech Republic,

d) LOOSENING TRADITIONAL FAMILY COHABITATION in

The United States, Norway, Sweden, Russia, Canada

RATIO OF DIVORCED INT THE PAST ACCORDING TO COUNTRIES

(N=33128)

Countries	Yes	No	Never married	Total
AUS	12,6	71,2	16,2	100,0
D-W	10,1	66,9	23,0	100,0
D-Ea	16,1	68,4	15,5	100,0
GB	18,7	68,7	12,6	100,0
NIRL	7,8	77,3	14,9	100,0
USA	28,8	59,2	12,1	100,0
A	13,0	87,0	-	100,0
H	14,5	71,4	14,1	100,0
I	3,0	78,3	18,7	100,0
IRL	1,9	81,4	16,6	100,0
NL	11,1	60,6	28,3	100,0
N	10,4	59,0	30,6	100,0
S	16,3	59,6	24,2	100,0
CZ	15,3	65,7	19,0	100,0
SLO	7,5	73,3	19,2	100,0
PL	8,2	74,5	17,2	100,0
BG	9,5	79,0	11,5	100,0
RUS	23,5	62,4	14,1	100,0
NZ	13,2	69,8	17,0	100,0
CDN	13,4	58,6	28,0	100,0
RP	7,4	73,7	18,9	100,0
IL	9,3	78,1	12,6	100,0
J	3,6	73,8	22,5	100,0
E	4,5	78,9	16,7	100,0
N=	3902	23094	6132	33128
Total %	11,8	69,7	18,5	100,0

Missing =462

DIVISION ACCORDING TO FAMILY STATUS

(N=33481)

Countries	Married cohabita-ting	Widowed	Divorced	Living separately	Single not yet married	Total
AUS	78,3	2,9	3,7	1,8	13,2	100,0
D-West	62,2	8,3	5,2	1,4	23,0	100,0
D-East	66,6	9,0	7,4	1,5	15.5	100,0
GB	59,8	10,8	11,5	-	17,9	100,0
NIRL	54,3	13,8	3,7	5,1	23,2	100,0
USA	51,2	9,5	15,3	2,9	21,0	100,0
A	66,8	7,2	5,3	-	20,7	100,0
H	59,1	16,7	8,5	1,7	14,0	100,0
I	64,1	5,4	1,3	0,8	28,4	100,0
IRL	61,6	9,6	0,5	-	28,3	100,0
NL	57,0	7,9	6,9	-	28,2	100,0
N	54,6	3,6	5,6	1,7	34,4	100,0
S	70,5	3,6	4,8	-	21,2	100,0
CZ	64,4	7,0	7,2	-	21,4	100,0
SLO	68,4	7,8	2,9	-	20,9	100,0
PL	65,3	11,7	4,8	1,1	17,2	100,0
BG	68,0	15,0	3,8	0,7	12,5	100,0
RUS	68,9	7,7	8,4	2,3	12,7	100,0
NZ	73,0	5,8	3,1	3,0	15,1	100,0
CND	61,6	2,4	4,7	1,7	29,6	100,0
RP	75,8	4,1	-	1,3	18,9	100,0
IL	74,5	4,1	5,1	0,4	15,9	100,0
J	69,1	6,9	1,5	0,2	22,3	100,0
E	60,7	7,1	1,4	2,1	28,7	100,0
N=	21509	2540	1744	424	7184	33481
Total %	64,5	7,6	5,2	1,3	21,4	100,0

Missing = 109

PARTNERSHIP WITHOUT MARRIAGE, NOT FOLLOWED BY MARRIAGE (N=31259)

Countries	With former partner	With present partner	With both	Not	Total
AUS	7,1	3,9	-	89,0	100,0
D-West	11,8	5,0	2,0	81,3	100,0
D-East	9,0	5,0	2,0	83,9	100,0
GB	10,2	5,5	2,7	81,6	100,0
NIRL	3,7	2,5	0,8	93,0	100,0
USA	16,4	4,0	3,1	76,4	100,0
A	13,3	6,1	1,0	79,6	100,0
H	6,5	2,4	0,9	90,2	100,0
I	2,8	2,2	0,3	94,8	100,0
IRL	3,5	1,2	0,5	94,8	100,0
NL	7,1	6,3	1,7	84,9	100,0
N	9,3	12,4	4,4	73,9	100,0
S	16,5	9,4	6,6	67,6	100,0
CZ	9,3	19,4	3,3	67,9	100,0
SLO	4,0	8,0	2,1	85,9	100,0
PL	5,7	1,8	0,9	91,7	100,0
BG	15,2	1,7	1,2	81,9	100,0
RUS	5,4	20,0	1,2	73,3	100,0
NZ	8,9	6,5	3,0	81,6	100,0
CDN	14,7	7,1	4,5	73,7	100,0
RP	3,9	4,7	0,6	90,8	100,0
IL	9,7	5,2	1,4	83,7	100,0
J	1,5	1,3	0,5	96,7	100,0
E	4,4	2,9	0,6	92,1	100,0
N=	2615	2025	603	26016	31259
%	8,4	6,5	1,9	83,2	16,8

Missing=2331

LIVED WITH PRESENT SPOUSE BEFORE MARRIAGE

(N=22369)

Countries	Yes	No	Total
AUS	24,4	75,6	100,0
D-W	36,5	63,5	100,0
D-Ea	46,7	53,3	100,0
GB	30,4	69,6	100,0
NIRL	9,0	91,0	100,0
USA	29,1	70,9	100,0
A	43,0	57,0	100,0
H	14,5	85,5	100,0
I	4,4	95,6	100,0
IRL	10,6	89,4	100,0
NL	28,5	71,5	100,0
N	41,9	58,1	100,0
S	53,3	46,7	100,0
CZ	31,6	68,4	100,0
SLO	35,8	64,2	100,0
PL	12,5	87,5	100,0
BG	21,7	78,3	100,0
RUS	47,3	52,7	100,0
NZ	23,7	76,3	100,0
CDN	25,6	74,4	100,0
RP	26,2	73,8	100,0
IL	23,8	76,2	100,0
J	7,5	92,5	100,0
E	7,2	92,8	100,0
N=	5959	16490	22369
Total %	26,6	73,4	100,0

RATIO OF DIVORCED IN THE PAST ACCORDING TO SCHOOLING

(N=30468)

Countries	No schooling	Unfinished primary school	Completed primary school	Unfinished secondary school	Completed secondary school	Unfinished higher education	Completed higher education	Total
AUS	-	12,5	16,3	13,6	10,8	-	11,2	12,6
D-West	-	9,1	11,6	8,7	5,2	8,5	11,9	10,1
D-East	-	9,5	17,7	16,0	3,9	8,9	19,6	16,1
GB	-	-	21,4	14,8	19,9	18,9	9,6	18,7
NIRL	-	-	6,6	5,6	8,5	11,8	7,7	7,8
USA	-	41,7	28,4	25,9	32,4	26,0	17,9	28,8
A	-	-	9,4	15,1	13,9	-	8,9	13,0
H	12,5	8,5	11,6	15,6	17,9	-	19,8	14,5
I	-	2,3	1,6	7,3	3,9	-	5,3	3,0
IRL	-	-	1,8	1,4	1,8	1,7	4,5	1,9
NL	-	-	11,0	13,9	7,2	11,4	8,8	11,1
N	-	-	10,2	-	9,6	13,9	10,2	10,4
S	-	-	17,3	14,6	12,6	18,5	20,0	16,3
CZ	-	66,7	16,0	17,6	14,4	6,7	14,4	15,3
SLO	-	8,7	6,1	15,0	7,0	16,2	6,8	7,5
PL	-	3,5	7,5	8,4	9,7	13,3	13,7	8,2
BG	4,0	8,2	8,0	2,7	9,6	9,5	13,2	9,5
RUS	-	11,6	21,1	32,6	21,0	23,6	21,7	23,5
NZ	-	-	11,8	15,8	15,9	11,0	9,2	13,2
CDN	-	-	26,1	19,8	13,3	13,6		13,4
RP	20,0	6,5	6,5	7,1	7,1	9,3		7,4
IL	18,0	25,0	18,6	6,8	9,1	6,4		9,3
J	1,8	12,5	5,1	4,9	3,5	2,7	0,7	3,6
E	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,5
N=	284	1095	6690	6311	8620	3853	3615	30468
%	4,6	7,5	11,3	13,5	12,6	14,0	12,1	11,8

RATIO OF PERSONS WHO LIVED IN PARTNERSHIP IN THE PAST ACCORDING TO SCHOOLING

(N=28635)

Countries	No schooling	Unfinished primary school	Completed primary school	Unfinished secondary school		Completed secondary school		Unfinished higher education		Completed higher education	Total
AUS	-	4,2	7,3	8,9	12,8		-		15,6		12,6
D-West	5,9	17,3	15,4	21,2	28,2		15,8		28,5		18,7
D-East-	-	7,1	11,0	21,9	12,5		13,2		19,6		16,1
GB	-	-	11,0	13,9	24,3		21,3		24,7		18,7
NIRL	-	-	6,5	4,2	9,5		7,8		1,9		7,0
USA	-	9,1	16,2	28,3	24,3		21,4		24,5		23,6
A	-	-	12,9	24,2	22,1		-		18,2		20,4
H	13,5	5,1	9,0	10,5	10,1		12,8		20,9		9,8
I	-	-	5,2	4,2	6,4		1,5		9,5		5,2
IRL	-	-	3,7	9,5	3,7		4,3		13,6		5,2
NL	-	-	8,0	11,5	12,1		26,0		31,1		15,1
N	-	-	19,8	-	27,8		27,9		30,7		26,1
S	-	-	28,7	32,3	32,6		36,9		37,6		33,3
CZ	-	66,7	26,7	32,4	30,9		38,7		35,8		32,1
SLO	-	10,6	13,7	5,0	15,4		16,2		15,7		14,1
PL	-	2,3	6,3	9,6	8,4		5,6		14,7		8,3
BG	4,0	7,0	8,6	24,3	20,8		24,1		26,7		18,1
RUS	11,1	11,8	12,6	21,2	27,5		30,7		28,0		26,7
NZ	-	-	10,2	17,8	22,9		18,7		18,9		18,4
CDN	-	-	25,0	32,5	23,3		29,3		23,8		26,3
RP	13,3	11,8	11,9	8,3	8,9		6,2		6,5		9,2
IL	4,2	7,1	8,6	14,3	16,2		18,9		20,0		16,3
J	-	-	2,2	9,8	3,7		3,4		3,6		3,3
N=	262	862	6245	5965	8149		3740		3406		28635
%	2,6	7,8	12,3	17,7	18,8		21,9		22,9

Selected bibliography

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Bourdieu, P.: Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. New Fetter Lane, London, 1979.

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